The Caribbean Chicken and Egg: Applying Lessons from the European Court of Justice to the Caribbean Court of Justice. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 5 No. 10, April 2008 by Perez, Fernando Alvarez.

 
   
 
 
   

34DIVNBO
 
.JBNJ'MPSJEB&VSPQFBO6OJPO$FOUFSPG
&YDFMMFODF
 
 
 
                                       The Caribbean Chicken and Egg:    
      Applying Lessons from the European Court of                 
Justice to the Caribbean Court of Justice 


'FSOBOEP"MWBSF[
1éSF[
   
 
                     
  
7PM/P
"QSJM 
   
 
1VCMJTIFEXJUIUIFTVQQPSUPGUIF&6
$PNNJTTJPO  
 
2 
2 
EUMA 
European Union Miami Analysis (EUMA), Special Series, is a service of analytical essays on 
current, trend setting issues and developing news about the European Union. 
 
These papers are produced by the Jean Monnet Chair, in cooperation with the Miami-Florida 
European Union Center of Excellence (a partnership of the University of Miami and Florida 
International  University)  as  an  outreach  service  for  the  academic,  business  and  diplomatic 
communities. 
 
Among the topics to be included in the series, the following are suggested: 
 
  The collapse of the Constitution and its rescue 
  Turkey: prospects of membership 
  Immigration crisis and cultural challenges 
  Security threats and responses 
  The EU and Latin America 
  The EU as a model and reference in the world 
  The Common Agricultural Policy and other public subsidies  
  The euro and the dollar 
  EU image in the United States 
 
These topics form part of the pressing agenda of the EU and represent the multifaceted and 
complex nature of the European integration process.  These papers also seek to highlight the 
internal and external dynamics which influence the workings of the EU and its relationship with 
the rest the world. 
 
Miami - Florida European Union Center             Jean Monnet Chair Staff 
 
University of Miami          Joaquín Roy (Director) 
1000 Memorial Drive          Astrid Boening (Associate Director) 
101 Ferré Building                     María Lorca (Associate Editor)   
Coral Gables, FL 33124-2231                    
Phone:  305-284-3266  Fax: (305) 284 4406    
Web: www.miami.edu/eucenter                               
                                                                                 Florida International University 
                                                                                 Elisabeth Prugl (FIU, Co-Director) 
 
Inter-American Jean Monnet Editorial Board 
 
Carlos Hakansson, Universidad de Piura, Perú 
Finn Laursen, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Canada 
Michel Levi-Coral, Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, Quito, Ecuador 
José Luis Martínez-Estay¸ Universidad de los Andes, Santiago de Chile, Chile 
Félix Peña, Universidad Nacional de Tres de Febrero, Buenos Aires, Argentina 
Stephan Sberro, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México 
Eric Tremolada, Universidad del Externado de Colombia, Bogotá, Colombia 
 
     
  
 
3 
3 
The Caribbean Chicken and Egg: 
Applying Lessons from the European Court of Justice to the 
Caribbean Court of Justice 
 
 
Fernando Alvarez Pérez
♣  
 
 
There is much scholarship on the institutional and political problems faced by the Caribbean 
Court  of  Justice  (CCJ)  and  CARICOM.  Much  of  it  is  excellent  scholarship,  especially  the 
enlightening perspective and analysis offered by Wendy Grenade. However, there is very little 
analysis that places the CCJ as a case of a much larger phenomenon – legal integration. The 
following analysis seeks to do just that, by employing the theories of legal analyses and the 
lessons of the ECJ to the CCJ. However, before beginning, one caveat is needed: the idea that the 
ECJ is an exceptional model and the only such example of a certain ideal in existence does not 
imply that Latin America (or the world in general) should try to replicate it. However, there is no 
more perfect example of supranational legal integration in existence. As such, when one does 
wish to consider this ideal, the ECJ is the only reasonable point of reference. The following 
analysis assumes a goal of integration (general and legal) within CARICOM. Since the EU and 
ECJ are the greatest examples of these forms of integration, it also assumes that the model to 
replicate can be found in the ECJ and the political environment that the ECJ evolved in. If this 
seems Eurocentric, it is, because it aims to be so. 
 There is one more point that must be touched on before one can begin examining what 
makes the ECJ special. There are many theories to explain general regional integration, and the 
validity of them is not relevant to this discussion. However, explaining legal integration has been 
almost purely the domain of two theories: liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism. As 
we will see, liberal intergovernmentalism does not fit well with the realities of legal integration, 
as the history of legal integration does not share the liberal intergovernmentalists’ emphasis on 
the self-interests of member states. Neofunctionalism is a theory of integration that has much to 
say about legal integration, and the most important aspect for this discussion is that of functional 
“spillover.” Most broadly, spillover can be said to occur when an integrative action in one area 
requires  integrative  action  in  another  area.  The  Court’s  various  rulings  have  illustrated  this 
concept perfectly.  
 
The European Court of Justice 
 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is the judicial arm of the European Union. Its main task is to 
interpret  EU  legislation  and  ensure  that  EU  legislation  is  uniformly  observed  throughout  the 
Member States (Skiadas 199). Its legal basis is found in the Treaty establishing the European 
Community (AKA Treaty of Rome). To relieve some of the burden of the ECJ’s enormous case 
load, a 1988 Council decision created the Court of First Instance (CFI) (200). The CFI is the front 
line of the ECJ, and it can refer cases to the ECJ when their outcomes have the ability to seriously 
affect the nature of Community law. Each EU Member State selects one judge to send to the ECJ. 
These judges are assisted by advocates general who deliver opinions to the Court. To ensure the 
judges’ impartiality with regard to their home Member States, the deliberations of the Court are 
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secret  and  there  are  no  publicly  available  dissenting  opinions.  The  ECJ  is  a  supremely 
supranational  actor.  The  Court’s  view  of  the  Treaty  as  a  constitution  has  been  an  enormous 
influence on its interpretation of the relationship between Community law and national law (202).  
But what is so special about the ECJ? What makes it different and why is it considered to 
be “the most effective supranational judicial body in the history of the world” (Sweet 18) and “the 
only such court in existence” with the supranational power that it has (Stiernstrom 11)? The 
answer is supranational legal integration. This ideal – supranational legal integration – can be 
defined by two concepts. The first concept is legal integration, which is best defined by Burley 
and Mattli as “the gradual penetration of [supranational] law into the domestic law of member 
states”  (43).    Legal  integration  itself  has  two  dimensions:  first  is  formal  penetration,  which 
involves the types of supranational law that take precedence over national law and the range of 
areas where individuals may invoke Community law in national courts second is substantive 
penetration, the “spilling over” of the ECJ’s competence from purely economic matters into new 
areas,  like  health,  safety,  education,  etc.  The  second  concept  that  defines  supranational  legal 
integration is of course, supranationality, the power of the institutions above the Member States, 
and the independence of those institutions from the influence of the Member States.  
Legal  integration  in  the  EC  experience  evokes  functionalist  spillover.  The  original 
“integrative action” can be the creation of the single market and the Community in general. 
Again, it is important to remember the two dimensions of legal integration: formal penetration 
and substantive penetration. Formal penetration is best exemplified in the cases of Van Gend en 
Loos
1, Costa-ENEL
2, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft
3, and Factortame
4. In all of these cases, 
the ECJ’s rulings managed to expand the reach of Community law (and therefore the ECJ) on the 
basis  of  ensuring  the  consistency  and  supremacy  of  the  Community.  Van  Gend  en  Loos 
established the doctrine of “direct effect,” wherein the Community can make laws that can be 
invoked  by  individuals  in  national  courts  (Stiernstrom  3-4).  According  to  Burley  and  Mattli, 
direct effect transformed the Treaty of Rome into a constitution, creating a “pro-Community 
constituency of private individuals” by injecting the supremacy of the Treaty over national law 
into this constituency’s self interest (60-61). If a European company were to object to the import 
customs in a national court on the grounds that it they violated article 25 of the EC treaty, this 
would be an example of a group whose self-interest lies in the supremacy of Community law. 
This is exactly what happened in Van Gend en Loos, and the company in the example was a 
Dutch chemical company called Van Gend en Loos.  
Two years later, in the Costa-ENEL case, the Court’s ruling established the concept of 
“supremacy” (AKA “primacy”), which establishes the supremacy of the Treaties over national 
laws (Stiernstrom 4). Thus, no national law could be made which contradicts the Treaties. Later 
the  supremacy  of  the  Treaties  over  national  law  was  extended  to  include  the  supremacy  of 
secondary  Community  legislation  over  national  law.  In  1970  in  Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft, the court ruled that EC law was not only supreme over national secondary 
law; it is even supreme over national constitutions (6). Finally, in 1989 in the Factortame case, 
the Court ruled that EU citizens have the right to right to request (and be granted) national courts 
to ignore national law in favor of Community law when that government has been too slow in 
passing  secondary  legislation  that  is  consistent  with  Community  law.  One  can  see  how  one 
integrative action necessitates another integrative action. The doctrine of direct effect simply 
would  not  have  been  a  complete  or  consistent  doctrine  without  the  doctrine  of  supremacy. 
Supremacy  (over  both  constitutions  and  secondary  legislation)  could  not  survive  if  national 
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legislators were given the responsibility of aligning their law with Community law, so the direct 
substitution of Community law for national law provided for by Factortame was a necessary 
corollary to the doctrine of supremacy.  
The  previous  cases  exemplify  formal  penetration,  which  involves  the  types  of 
supranational law that can take precedence over national law and the extent to which individuals 
can  invoke  Community  law  in  national  courts.  The  most  exemplary  case  of  substantive 
integration has come from the Court’s rulings on the ability of the European Commission to enter 
into international agreements on behalf of the Member States. These rulings almost beg for a 
neofunctionalist  interpretation  because  the  Court  implicitly  justified  its  rulings  in  terms  of 
functionalist pull. The language of the AETR
5 case is telling:  
     In Particular, each time the Community, with a view to implementing a 
common  policy  envisaged  by  the  Treaty,  adopts  provisions  laying  down 
common rules, whatever form these may take, the Member States no longer 
have  the  right,  acting  individually  or  even  collectively,  to  undertake 
obligations with third countries affecting those rules. 
As and when such common rules come into being, the Community alone is in a position to 
assume and carry out contractual obligations towards third countries which affect those rules.” 
(qtd. in Dashwood and Heliskoski 5). 
            This means that wherever the Community has internal competence, it is necessary that any 
external  obligations  affecting  those  internal  “objectives”  be  negotiated  by  a  supranational 
Community body (the Commission). This is an obvious case of one integrative action (internal 
integration) requiring a further integrative action (integration of external obligations). This also 
raises another point: the power of a supranational Court to drive not just legal integration, but the 
integration of the Community. Specifically, it speaks to the power of the Court to empower the 
supranational institutions of the Community. This leads to the second dimension of supranational 
legal integration. 
  The supranational character of the ECJ may seem to be a given, something self-evident to 
all. However, the liberal inter-governmentalist scholarship of Moravcsik and his followers have 
offered  alternative  explanations.  This  approach  no  longer  plays  a  substantial  role  in  legal 
integration  studies,  but  it  is  important  to  understand  why  it  fails  because  it  relates  to  the 
experience of integration in Latin America. According to this approach, Member States delegate 
and pool sovereignty in supranational judicial bodies so as to ensure that cooperation with mutual 
obligations. If defection from obligations were the norm, there would be no gains to cooperation 
(Laursen 7). It was later research – especially Garrett – that brought the ECJ into this theoretical 
Framework (see Garrett 1995). The main problem with this approach is that it views the ECJ as 
an agent of the Member States’ preferences. In fact, this is not so. The ECJ has created a legal 
system  that  is  quite  independent  of  the  preferences  of  Member  States.  Referring  back  the 
“constitutionalization” of the Treaty of Rome, it is important to recognize that this created not just 
a “pro-Community constituency” of individuals below the state, but a legal system above the state 
(Burley and Mattli 54). The language of the Van Gend en Loos ruling indicates just how seriously 
the Court took this concept: 
     [T]he Community constitutes a new legal order
6 of international law for 
the  benefit  of  which  the  States  have  limited  their  sovereign  rights,  albeit 
within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member 
States but also their nationals. (qtd. in Stiernstrom 3) 
 
Here the Court makes reference to the power below the state (“their nationals”). More 
importantly though is what is being created above the state. The “new legal order” refers to the 
                                                           
    
5 Case 22/70, Commission v. Council [1971] E.C.R. 263. 
    
6 emphasis added  
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Treaty in its role as a truly supranational constitution. Also take note that the Court is not afraid to 
assert that there is in fact a limitation of state sovereignty required by the Community. This is a 
bold  assertion  on  a  very  sensitive  area.  This  new  legal  order  has  included  not  just  the 
constitutionalization of the Treaty of Rome but also the creation of a case law that goes above the 
state.  Sweet  conducted  a  statistical  analysis  that  shows  the  amount  of  times  that  an  ECJ 
preliminary ruling referred to a previous ECJ judgment (33). The rising incidence of such an 
event indicates the creation of a body of case law independent of the state. By 1995 over 80% of 
ECJ preliminary rulings were referring to previous cases. Another statistical analysis by Sweet 
examined  a  sample  of  cases  before  the  ECJ  that  pitted  sub-national  actors  (in  this  case, 
import/export  firms)  against  Member  States  (38-39).  In  all  of  the  selected  cases  both  the 
Commission and the relevant Member State submitted official written documentation of their 
preferences and arguments. Sweet found that the ECJ is no more likely to rule in favor of the 
State’s preferences than against. In fact, the rulings were in accordance with the Commission’s 
preference 85% of the time. The most important and dramatic example of the lack of concern for 
Member State preferences comes, again, from Van Gend en Loos. The opinions of the advocates 
general are made public, and since they – like the ECJ judges – are elected by their Member 
States, they are directly accountable to the Member States. Of course the ECJ judges have special 
protections to ensure their impartiality, as previously mentioned. The opinion of the advocates 
general in Van Gend en Loos was actually against the doctrine of direct effect (Skiadas 199-200). 
One would be hard pressed to see the Court as a direct agent of Member States’ preferences.  
 
The Caribbean Court of Justice 
 
The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) currently has 15 Member States. Its roots can be found 
in  the  failed  West  Indian  Federation  and  the  1968  Caribbean  Free  Trade  Area  (CARIFTA) 
(Grenade  “An  Overview...”  167-168).  In  1973  the  Treaty  of  Chaguaramas  established 
CARICOM,  a  community  with  three  main  objectives:  economic  integration,  functional 
cooperation  and  foreign  policy  coordination.  In  1989  the  Grand  Anse  Declaration  set  out  a 
number of key initiatives, among them the creation of a CARICOM Single Market Economy 
(CSME) (172). The CCJ can trace its roots through a number of forms all the way back to the 
1973 Treaty of Chaguaramas, but its official position stems from the Agreement Establishing the 
Caribbean Court of Justice, incorporated into the 2001 Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.  
  The first point to examine relates to with the CCJ’s jurisdiction. The CCJ was scheduled 
to come into force in 2003, but was postponed several times and finally was implemented in 
2003, in a modified form that many have branded, almost pejoratively as a “trade court” (Hinds 
192). The “trade court” label is meant to imply that the CCJ will focus purely on economic 
matters. The reality of the CCJ is not that simple or grim. The CCJ in the Agreement Establishing 
the Caribbean Court of Justice was meant to be a hybrid court. It would have both appellate 
jurisdiction and original jurisdiction. In its appellate jurisdiction, the Court considers appeals in 
civil and criminal law from the (sub)national courts of those that signed onto the CCJ. In its 
original jurisdiction, the CCJ will mirror the ECJ: interpreting Treaty application and ensuring the 
consistency of compliance across the Member States (Hamilton 278). To sign onto the appellate 
jurisdiction  of  the  CCJ,  the  Member  States  need  anywhere  from  2/3
rds    majority  to  3/4
ths  of 
national parliament votes to alter their constitution to do so (Grenade “Exploring...” 13). The 
majority  of  Member  States  have  yet  to  do  this.  The  “exclusive”  and  “compulsory”  original 
jurisdiction, however, applies automatically to all of the signatories of the CCJ (Pollard “closing 
the  circle...”  177-178).  If  one  wished  to  integrate  every  single  aspect  of  the  law  into  one 
supranational body, then the CCJ’s role as a “trade court” is a disappointment. However, even the 
ECJ does not do this. A murder case can not be appealed all the way up to the European Court of 
Justice. As Hamilton notes, the CCJ and the ECJ have similar mandates: to ensure the consistency 
of compliance with Community law across the Member States, especially with regards to the  
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implementation of the single market. Recall that the ECJ made some of the most important steps 
in integration through its role of ensuring the implementation of the single market. Van Gend en 
Loos and the AETR doctrine created integration through the vehicle of the single market. The 
principles of direct effect and supremacy were not explicitly included in the Treaty of Rome, but 
were created through the aggressive activism of the Court. Thus, we should disabuse ourselves of 
the notion that the CCJ is weak because it is a “trade court.” 
  The problem is not what jurisdiction the CCJ has. The real fundamental problem is what 
the CCJ has jurisdiction over. Does the Court preside over a Community which has limited its 
sovereign  rights?  Barely.  As  Grenade  has  said,  “unlike  the  European  Union,  “[CARICOM] 
remains a community of sovereign independent states” and it is almost purely intergovernmental 
(“exploring...”  1,5).  The  EU  is  also  a  community  of  sovereign  independent  states,  but  the 
expression  of  that  sovereignty  takes  on  supranational  forms,  which  is  almost  nonexistent  in 
CARICOM. There is no supreme supranational body in CARICOM. Instead of an analogue of the 
European  Commission,  CARICOM  has  the  Conference  of  Heads  of  Government  (like  the 
European Council) and the Community Council of Ministers (like the Council of the European 
Union) (7-8). Supranationality plays no part in the legislative process of CARICOM. Unanimity 
reigns supreme. Thus, the independence from the will of the Member States does not exist in 
CARICOM.  The  CCJ  and  Caribbean  integration  in  general  are  hostage  to  national  partisan 
politics (Hinds 185). Hinds offers that the reason for this general unwillingness to submit to a 
supranational authority is that the perceived erosion of national sovereignty that comes with a 
Community strikes fear into the hearts of Caribbean elites wishing to dispense patronage and 
control their domestic economies (196). Adding to the list of woes is the fact that not all of this 
community has even signed onto the CCJ. The Bahamas, Montserrat and Haiti have not signed on 
(Leathley 143). CARICOM is a community (with a small c), not a Community. 
  Just as serious is the issue of compliance. There is no analogous concept of direct effect 
in Caribbean Community law. The enforcement of CCJ rulings requires that national legislatures 
transplant the ruling into national law (Leathley 145). Thus, the Member States have control over 
their own compliance. Other problems plague the CCJ. The Privy Council case of Pratt and 
Morgan v. Attorney General of Jamaica created the image of the CCJ as a “hanging court” – one 
that promotes capital punishment (Grenade 9). Arguably, it is worse to be a “hanging court” than 
a “trade court.” Grenade also mentions that the legitimacy of the Court as a supranational actor is 
seriously questioned by Caribbean elites (193).  
  From this analysis of the Caribbean Court of Justice, one can see a sort of “chicken and 
egg” problem. In the case of Europe, neofunctionalist pull required the ECJ to further general 
European  integration  and  European  integration  also  led  to  supranational  legal  integration. 
Caribbean Community law does not have direct effect, and the European experience has shown 
that direct effect was critical to the establishment of the supremacy of Community law and the 
creation of the “new legal order.” However, it is this supremacy and new legal order that allowed 
the  ECJ  to  further  European  integration  in  later  years.  However,  the  CCJ  can’t  definitively 
establish  direct  effect  unless  it  has  some  sort  of  Community  to  preside  over.  This  is  the 
fundamental obstacle to legal integration (and regional integration in general) in the Caribbean. 
There  was  no  original  integrative  action  from  which  to  build  upon.  National  sovereignty 
precludes any possible benefits to cooperation in the Caribbean. Thus, the Caribbean is faced with 
a choice: continue on the current path or pool sovereignty as the EU has done. Where exactly the 
current path leads is beyond the scope of this paper, but it will never lead to a Community. 
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